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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases, unknown to the common law
and in the past contemplated with adhorrence by eminent jurists, is now
firmly rooted in American law and growing steadily if not rapidly.
During the early years, all trial (both civil and criminal) were conducted in the atmosphere of a sports contest. Disclosure to an adversary
would have violated principles of true sportsmanship. Commenting on
this situation, Sir J. Arnold in 1874 said:'
The only answer . . . is that English criminal )rocedUrc does not
so much seek the discovery ()f truth pure and simple, as the discoverv of truth according to Crtai:' artificial rules ....
.The
prisoner must be convicted according to the strict rules of the
legal game or not convicied at all and that, too, however clear
his guilt may be.
In 1895 Sir F. Pollack and Professor F. XV. Maitland put it this way in
their History of English Law, 1I 667: 2
At one of these (poles or extremes) the model is the conduct of
the man of science who is making researches and will use all
a)propriate methods for the solution of problems and tile discovery of truth. At the other, stands the umpire of our English
games, who is there not in order that he may invent tests for the
powers of the two sides, but merely to see that the rules of the
game are observed. It is towards the second of these ideals that
our English medieval procedure is strongly inclined. We are
often reminded of the cricket match. The judges sit in the court,
not in ordler that they may answer the question "how's that?"
This passive habit seems to grow upon them as time goes on ...
Even in a criminal cause, even when the King is prosecuting, the
English judge will, if he can, play the umpire rather than inquisitor.
Such statements by eminent authorities ( plus the fears that discovery
would foster perjury or that unscrupulous opponents would abuse the
privilege), suppressed the growth of discovery techniques in criminal
procedure.
In the civil procedure area, however, the discovery technique received
somewhat early recognition.
It is believed to have originated in the
ecclesiatical courts, through the use of the device of having tie complaining
party state his position, and requiring the other party to answer by swearing
to the facts pleaded.3 The whole procedure was under the control of the
court. From this notion the courts of equity adopted the concept of the
bill of discovery. By this procedure one could obtain such facts as might
tend to prove his own case, but one could not prove into evidence which
would tend to prove or disprove the case of his opponent. Finally the
common law courts of England allowed a form of discovery in civil cases,
1. 6 Wignmore, Evidence, § 1845 ) 3d ed. 1940).
2. Ibid.
.. 4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 169 (1931).
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after the passage of the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875. The courts of the
United States generally allowed the bill of discovery, but with the enactment of statutory methods the bill of discovery became obsolete. For at
lease 30 years, coin prehensive statutes for discovery in civil cases have
4
existed in the United States.
But this evolution in the civil discovery area did not carry over into

the criminal law; courts and legislatures continued reluctant to allow
criminal discovery of any type. The requirement of excluding witnesses
whose niames had not been furnished to the defendant never existed at
common law, but statutes gradually set it up. ;' Much less was tie accused
allowed to inspect notes of testimony taken before the grand jury; nor
could the disclosure of' any other evidence be obtained.';
Even as recently as 1927, New York, in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Cortt,, 7 failed to recognize discovery in criminal matters. Speaking through
Cardozo, the court denied defendant access to autospy reports or files of an
accomplice's statements made to the prosecution, on the grounds the
documents were inadmissible as evidence. Cardozo perceived the faint
beginnings of criminal discovery, but failed to deviate from the common
law notion of denying discovery in criminal matters. He did indicate,
however, that discovery existed in a limited sense in other states, and
hinted that perhaps the trial court may have inherent power to allow
discovery.
After the Lemon case, the general attitude regarding discovery in
criminal cases began to change. The courts went off in three directions:";
(1) Some courts granted discovery to a limited extent as a matter of right

to the defendant. (2) A few continued to insist that the trial court lacked
inherent power to grant discovery. (3) Others allowed discovery as a
matter with in the trial court's discretion. Many courts including Wyoming have not chosen one of these three possible roads.
The purpose of this paper is to explore these judicial attitudes. The
discussion of cases will be limited to pre-trial discovery of the defendant's
statements or confessions, and pre-trial statements by a witness. But the
statutes discussed cover a broader area than merely statements or confessions.
Louisiana adopted the first view (discovery as a matter of right) in
1945 by State v. Dorsey.. In deciding that the defendant's written confession in the hands of the prosecution was subject to discovery, the court
went further by holding that such denial of access was a deprivation of
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

38 Yale L.J. 746 (1929).
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-119, 7-120 (1957) is an example.
Wigmore, supra note 2.
245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, 52 A.L.R. 200 (1927).
32 Temp. L.Q. 217 (1958).
State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928. 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
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clue process. In 1960, however, the Louisana court decided in a summary
fashion that such constitutional right does not extend to copies of the
defendant's oral statements. 10
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled on the constitutional issue. Lack of due process by denying the defendant access to his
confession was one of many grounds urged for reversal in Leland v. Oregon.1 ' While saying that the better practice may be to allow discovery, nevertheless in a summary fashion, the court held such denial not to be unconstitutional.
In contrast to the Louisana view (discovery as a matter of right) some
courts have held that discovery is not available to the defendant even at the
trial court's discretion. Some have said that a witness' statements in the
hands of the prosecutor are not public records hence not subject to
12
discovery.
The most interesting line of cases lies in the third category-existence
of discovery not as a right, but within the court's discretion. Many forceful
and compelling arguments have been voiced in this area. Maryland was
among the first to recognize the inherent power of the court by allowing
discovery of a confession.' 3 The court was not impressed by the fear of the
prosecuting attorney that the exercise of such discretion will change the
whole practice of criminal law by making a conviction more difficult to
obtain. Rather the court realized a "measure of elemental justice" in
permitting the accused access to his confession.
New Jersey's contribution consists of three decisions. In State v.
Cicenia (1951) 14 the court held that while the trial court, within its
discretion, had the power to allow discovery, the defendant had no aboslute
right to a pre-trial inspection of his confession and thus affirmed the lower
court's denial of discovery. Then two years later in State v. Tune,'5 the
trial court did exercise its discretion in allowing inspection of a confession
before trial. By a four to three decision, the trial court was reversed. The
majority claimed that discovery would not lead to honest fact-finding but
rather to perjury and suppression of the evidence in the accused's
attempt to set up a false defense. The minority claimed State v. Cicenia
was precedent and to hold otherwise would render the earlier decision
sterile.
In 1958, however, in State v. Johnson,'6 the court reversed the stand
taken in State v. Tune. Despite the fears of the majority in State v. Tune,
the court pointed out compelling reasons in favoring discovery. Starting
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

State v. Bickham, 238 La. 1094, 121 So. 2d 207 (1960).
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); Dowling v. State, 166 Tex.
Cr. App. 43, 317 S.W.2d 533 (1958).
State v. Haas, 188 Md. 203, 51 A.2d 647 (1947).
6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568 (1951).
13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
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with the premise that truth is best revealed by a decent opportunity to
prepare for the trial and recognizing that counsel isn't sure or doesn't
even know whether he needs the inspection until he has it, the court
discounted the fears of perjury. Weight was also given to the state's
ability to conduct a superior investigation. "The state is immediately
at the scene of the crime with a staff. Even pecunious defendants are rarely
represented at this stage."' 7
2
More recently, Washington, i s Utah,1 9 California 20 and Oklahoma
have joined the liberal camp allowing discovery as a matter within the
court's discretion. Typical of the thinking involved in this area is the
Utah case. In allowing pre-trial discovery of the transcript of a grand
jury witness the court argued the defense cannot know whether prior testimony of the witness was inconsistent with the testimony given at the trial
unless he knows what the testimony before the grand jury was. While
acknowledging the value of the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings the
court added that since the trial judge discretely and properly circumscribed
the procedure so that only material portions of the transcript of the testimony of the witness would be exposed, he had not abused his discretion.
In an acrimonious dissent, Justice Henriod voiced his fear of the "boomerang" effect of "do good statutes and decisions."

One of the recent cases of great interest is from New York.22 This
state had previously recognized the existence of discovery in the court's
discretion.23 In People v. Rocario, the trial court refused to turn over
the statements of the prosecution's witness before trial. In reversing, the
Court of Appeals declared that a right sense of justice entiles the defense
to examine a witness' prior statement whether or not it varies from his
testimony on the stand, because something will be withheld from the
defense counsel which may assist him in impeaching the witness; hence the
court allowed the defendant to inspect as a matter of right before the trial.
The court attached three limitations to its decision: (1) the statement
should relate to the subject matter of the witness' testimony, (2) the
statement may only be used for impeachment purposes, (3) statements
of secret or confidential dealings would be excluded, as required by the
necessities of law enforcement.
Another area of concern is the availablity of the discovery process to the
state against a defendant. A recent case comes from California.2 4 The
defendant, accused of rape, filed a motion for continuance and an affidavit
in which he alleged impotency as a result of an earlier accident. The
majority allowed the state discovery of the doctor's reports and X-rays
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ibid. at 318.
State v. Thompson, 154 Wash. Dec. 91, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959).
Powell v. Supreior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
State ex rel. Sadler v. Lakey, 319 P.2d 310 (1957).
People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y. 2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881 (1961).

23.

People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422

24.

Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).

(1933).
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following the accident.

The defendant

raised two

constitutional issues. First he argued that the past cases which the discovery are not based on the court's power to develop rules of procedure
but on notions of due 'process. And since there was no constitutional
mandate to extend discovery to the prosecution it could not do without
enabling statutory authority. The court answered that when it permitted
the defendant pre-trial discovery in the past, it was not acting under
constitutional comp)ulsion, rather it was seeking the orderly ascertainment
Secondly,
of truth. "'That procedure should not be a one-way street."2'.
the defendant invoked the privilege against sell-incrimination. The court
noted that statutes requiring the delendant to disclose tile names of alibi
witnesses did not violate the privilege. By analogy a requirement of disclosing evilence pertaining to the affirmative defense of impotency
would not violate the privilege either. The dissent was fearful not so
much of the step taken but of its )ossible implication.
DISCOVERY

UNDER

STATUTES

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have set the stage for statutory development of discovery in criminal cases. Under the federal system, Rules 15a, 16 and 17c pertain to discovery. Rule 15a enables the
defendant to deposition a witness who "may he unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial," and the court may require a witness to
produce designated papers and docunents at the time and place of
deposition. 2"; Decisions under the rule have indicated that the prosecution mutst answer interrogatories propountled by the defense, unless the
2
inquiry goes clearly beyond the scope of tile case. '
Rule 16 allows discovery of docunuts and papers belonging to the
defendant or seized from third persons and now in possession of the
prosecution. 2'1 ilhe underlying philosophy here is to allow the defendant
29
access to material which would otherwise not be available to him.
Accordingly, materials which are readily available to the defendant or
voluntary statements (such as confessions) made to atthorties are not
within the scope of the rule, since they were not obtained by seizure or
process.au FtIrther limitations are: (1) the right -to inspect extends only
to the defendantAt (2) a sufficient showing of material-ity to the case is
25.
26.

27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

Ibid. at 881.
a trial . . .
"If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend ...
the court . . . may . . . order that his testimony be taken by deposition and that
any designated hooks, papers, documents or tangible objects, not privileged, be
produced at the same time and place .. " Fed. R. Crim. p. 15 (a).
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 168 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
"Upon inotion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment of
information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents,
or tangible objects, obtained from and belonging to the defendant or obtained
from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of his defense and that his reqttest is reasonable.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
United States v. Woodner, 24 F.R.D. 33 (D.C. N.Y. 1959).
Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960).
United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954).
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needed,: 2 (3) defendant's own statements or confession in the hands of
the prosecution are ordinarily not available for inspectionA
Rule 17c authorizes the court to issue a subpeona duces tecum ordering
the production of "books, documents or objects" before the commencement
This rule does not purport to provide for additional means
of the trial..3 4
But in another
of discovery but is only a means to expedite the trial.-'
sense this rule expands Rule 16 by allowing inspection of documents which
would be admissible in evidence and have been obtained by the prosecution, voluntarily or otherwise.:"; Further, under this rule the defendant's
own statements in the hands of the prosecution may be inspected under
certain circumstances.3 7 Thus written confessions are within Rule 17c
although not within Rule 16.
Closely related in substance to the federal rules are the new Colorado
Rules of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1961.
As noted previously,
Colorado courts were reluctant to recognize discovery.
Colorado Rules
15, 16 and 17 (corresponding to their federal counterparts) provide for
discovery. Rule 15a, derived from the corresponding federal rule, allows
the prosecution or the defendant to deposition a witness who "may be
unable to attend a trial or hearing ... to prevent injustice." Additionally
the court order "may require that any designated books, papers, docttments, photogrophs or tangible objects not privileged" to be produced.-"
Rule 15g, having no federal counterpart, insures the defendant acquisition
of a transcribed copy of the deposition taken by the state, without cost.4
Rule 16 (a) being substantially identical to the federal rule 16, allows
the defendant access to books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible
objects which were obtained by seizure. 4 1 Rule 16b enables the court to
order the prodttction of "any statements of the witness in the possession of
the prosecuting attorney . . . which relate to the subject matter to which
the witness has testified.'' 1 Rule 16c provides for the trial judge's inspection of a witness' testimony. However, this inspection is not allowed until
32.

United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935
v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 230

(W.D. Pa.

1959):

United States

(N.). N.Y. 1951).

33.

Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8(h Cir. 1949); United States v. Patrisso, 20

34.

"A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers. documents or other objects designated therein ....
The court

F.R.I). 576 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).

may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated

3'5.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

in

the subpoena

be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time
when they are to be offered in evidence and lnay upon their production permit
the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof be inspected hv the
parties and their attorneys." Fed. R. Cromn. P. 17 (c).
Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
Ibid.
57 Colum. L. Rev. 1113 (1957).
Walker v. People, supra note 12.
Colo. R. Crim. P. 15 (a).
"If the deposition is taken at the instance of the State, a transcribed copy of it
shall be furnished without cost to the defendant promptly upon his request." Colo.
R. Crimn. P. 1 5 (g).
Colo. R. Crimn. P. 16(a).
Colo. R. Crini. P. 16 (b).
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after the witness has testified. But 16c in recognizing the handicap of the
43
defendant allows him recess if the court so desires.
Rule 17c allowing inspection of "papers, documents, photographs or
44
objects" is substantially similar to the corresponding federal rule.
DISCOVERY

IN WYOMING

Wyoming authority concerning the issue of pre-trial discovery is scant.
Wyoming Statutes Sections 7-253 and 7-258 allow the prosecution or the
defendant to deposition a material witness who is about to leave the
state or who is sick or infirm. Section 7-255 allows the defendant to crossexamine the states' witness on deposition. Mention of the defendant's
45
right to a duplicate copy of the deposition is wanting.
Beyond the deposition statutes one could argue that Rule 1 of the
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 'provides for the application of the
civil rules to the trial of criminal cases, thus unlocking civil discovery
techniques to the accused. 4" But such a construction has been disapproved
47
by other jurisdictions with similar code provisions.
Aside from the statutes, State v. Vines, 48 though not directly in point,
mentioned the existence of discovery. Not knowing whether he was
charged as the principal or an accessory, the defendant filed a plea in
abatement, praying that the information be abated, and he be granted a
preliminary examination. Stating that the effect would have been practically the same had the defendant been charged in two separate counts
as principal and an accessory, the court sustained the state's demurrer. The
opinion reasoned that the defendant's main purpose in requesting a preliminary examination was to obtain a disclosure of the states' evidence.
By way of dicta the court observed that there was no common law rule
allowing discovery as a matter of right but, citing the Lemon case, the
court recognized a body of authority for the view that a trial court had
such discretionary power. Thus the dicta in the Vines case seems to
incline to the third view-that discovery is allowable in the trial court's
discretion-although the holding amounts to denial of the limited discovery
sought by the accused.
CONCLUSIONS

In view of the desirability of providing discovery procedures, provisions
should be added to the Wyoming criminal code to guard against injustice.
In the main, the Federal and Colorado discovery procedures strike an
equal balance between the rights of the defense and the prosecution.
While providing the defendant with certain liberal discovery techniques,
43.

Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(c).

44.

Colo. R.

45.

Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-253 to 7-258 (1957).

46.

Wyo. R. Civil P. 1.
United States v. Malnisky, 19 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); State v. Rhoads, 6 Ohio
393, 91 N.E. 86 (1910).
49 Wyo. 212, 54 P.2d 826 (1936).

47.
48.

Crim.

P.

17 (c).
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opportunity for abuse by an unscrupulous opponent seems absent, inasmuch
as the whole procedure is under the judge's control. Colorado Rule 15g
which gives the defendant the right to a copy of a deposition taken by the
State is especially desirable.
Shortcoming, however, exist. The point in time for allowing the
inspection of the witness' prior statements should be changed to pre-trial
rather than after the witness has testified. As the point in time for discovery now stands, the defendant enjoys no more right to inspect the
witness' statements for inconsistency before trial than he enjoyed at common law. To allow the defendant access to the witness' prior statements
for impeachment purposes after the witness has testified has always been
the common law. 49 A defendant can successfully discover inconsistencies
only when he has access to the witness' statements before the trial. No
abuse will befall the procedure if the trial court has control of the process.
NICK KALOKATHIS
49.

34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 33

(1961).

